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Abstract 
 Juwita Purnami Restu Suwondo. Pascasarjana Fakultas Ekonomi dan 
Bisnis Universitas Brawijaya. Central Bank Credibility and Government 
Regulation: A Paradox?. Ketua Pembimbing: Prof. Munawar Ismail, SE, DEA, 
PHD. Komisi Pembimbing: Dr. Rern-Jay Hung. 
    The purpose of this paper is to understand how the regulation affects 
central bank credibility through inflation rate, and to investigate whether or not a 
paradox really exists between those two regulations. This research took place in 
Central Bank of Indonesia because the secondary data was taken from Central 
Bank of Indonesia, with partly obtained from Central Bureau of Statistic (BPS), and 
World Economic Outlook IMF (International Monetary Fund. The data gathered in 
this research is secondary, which published officially by Central Bank of Indonesia, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), from 
2007 to 2013. The method of Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) estimation is 
being used in this thesis. The model (both inflation and credibility equations) 
provided evidences that suggested that there is indeed a negative relationship 
between government regulation and the central bank credibility in Indonesia. It 
indicates that as the import agreement (ACFTA) is being held, and the import quota 
becomes higher, the central bank credibility turned out to be lower, through its 
impact on the inflation rate. 
 
Keywords: inflation, credibility, ACFTA, regulation 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
In so far as ‘credibility’ is understood in this ordinary English sense, it would 
be bizarre to favor ‘incredible’ or ‘non-credible’ over ‘credible’ monetary policy. 
Approval is one thing that is conveyed through the word “credible”, no matter the 
kind of form it takes. So far, research conducted about central bank credibility is 
almost always built from macroeconomics indicators that Taylor had created in the 
late 1993. Linear equations often run until 2011, including Waluyo, et al, had 
performed about the credibility of the Central Bank of Indonesia. Though in fact, 
non linear equation model is already investigated by Neuenkirch, et al in the last 
2012. Several other researches had been conducted from all around the world, 
and explored from various perspectives, from how the model should be until what 
are the best indicators that can explain better, etc. But none of the above had 
chosed a path to dig the issue from agricultural side, through government 
regulation, regarding the food price problems. 
 
Back to the very basic issue on this matter, central bank credibility is indeed 
what spends energy and time for all the monetary policy makers. A central bank 
can be considered as credible when the actual inflation matches the target rate 
that the bank released as an official statement. The more credible the central bank 
is, the more economic agents would be willing to follow its lead concerning inflation 
rate controlling. And that, without a doubt, is the dream for all central banks, to 
have the economic agents to help succeeding the goal of the monetary policy. 
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Because as we all know, the lag that exists in every form of government policy is 
dragging enough in the transmission mechanism, let alone if the people do not 
obey and react in the favor way for central bank. The lower the central bank 
credibility is, the less trust people would be giving in the future and that can 
ultimately lead to the next level of nightmare: inflation persistence (Forder, 2004; 
Waluyo, 2011; Henckel, 2013, Tanaka, 2013). 
 
Tabel 1.1: INFLATION RATE DURING 2007-2013 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
inflatio
n 
inflatio
n 
inflatio
n 
inflatio
n 
inflatio
n 
inflatio
n 
inflatio
n 
Jan 1.04 1.77 -0.07 0.84 0.89 0.76 1.03 
Feb 0.62 0.65 0.21 0.3 0.13 0.05 0.75 
Mar 0.24 0.95 0.22 -0.14 -0.32 0.07 0.63 
Apr -0.16 0.57 -0.31 0.15 -0.31 0.21 -0.1 
May 0.1 1.41 0.04 0.29 0.12 0.07 -0.03 
June 0.23 2.46 0.11 0.97 0.55 0.62 1.03 
July 0.72 1.37 0.45 1.57 0.67 0.7 3.29 
Agt 0.75 0.51 0.56 0.76 0.93 0.95 1.12 
Sep 0.8 0.97 1.05 0.44 0.27 0.01 -0.35 
Okt 0.79 0.45 0.19 0.06 -0.12 0.16 0.09 
Nov 0.18 0.12 -0.03 0.6 0.34 0.07 0.12 
Dec 1.1 -0.04 0.33 0.92 0.57 0.54 N.A 
Yearl
y 
6.59 11.06 2.78 6.96 3.79 4.3  
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Indonesia, 2013 
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 For the past six years, inflation fluctuated a lot in Indonesia. It can be seen 
clearly from Table 1 that it experienced an immense move especially on the 2008 
global financial crash. From 2010 onwards, the fluctuation calmed down a little bit. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Inflation Rate During 2007-2013 Period 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Indonesia, 2013 (modified) 
 
Central bank, in the case of Indonesia, is an independent institution in the 
country. That is not the overstatement of the century, as it’s actually a government 
institution that hold an equal position with another government elite institutions, 
such as The Parliament, Financial Investigators (BPK), and even the Supreme 
Court. The chair the Central Bank of Indonesia is sitting on isn’t on the equal level 
of The Financial Department because CBI (Central Bank of Indonesia) is an elite 
institutions outside the government. The power and position CBI holds is necessary 
in order to maintain its role and function as a Monetary Authority with more 
efficiently and effectively (Central Bank of Indonesia, 2013). In other words, it’s the 
main characteristics of a central bank to not operating under control of a system or 
getting wrapped around its little finger, as its primary purpose is to make proper 
6.59%
11.06%
2.78%
6.96%
3.79%
4.30%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Inflation
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monetary policies work in the country. Milton Friedman was one of the front liners 
in supporting the central bank independency and it seems like CBI also rides the 
in same boat. 
But it’s not a mere credibility that holds responsibility for the national welfare 
in Indonesia. Though enjoying a high level of credibility means all is good and well, 
and the central bank can control the monetary sector as one anticipate, the welfare 
would still go down if the output stability is quite low, and thus the chance of welfare 
would diminish, or even gone negative. Bottom line, high output level plus under-
control inflation and stable exchange rate equals national welfare achievements. 
But facts are not always fitting right with what one has hoped. Even if the target 
level inflation can be reached, when the national income doesn’t go as smoothly, 
there would never be a pass-through effect to the economic welfare. 
Ueda and Valencia (2012) discussed this matter further with raising 
awareness about time inconsistency in the monetary policy making. It means there 
is an inconsistency of the monetary transmission mechanism of a central bank in 
the country, which mostly happens because the gap between two big goals run at 
the moment. To put it simple, when a central bank has focused on the financial and 
monetary stability area and put all of the efforts there, and the government itself 
has lavished all attention to the output stability, the gap between the two parties 
can overlap, and it would create an inconsistency in the process of the monetary 
policy’s result making. This kind of double-side policy making is called macro 
prudential. 
The point of this so-called time inconsistency is that when a central bank is 
not being consistent in implying its monetary policy on two different times, which 
are ex-ante and ex-post of the transmission process. A central bank fails to focus 
on just one goal in the policy making. This kind of condition can create an inflation 
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bias. The uncertainty in financial sector will always be there, especially because 
the existence of the infamous imperfect information, and the tendency of human 
beings to be quite the opportunist, but this problem can get wider and reach out to 
the monetary instrument policy, which ends up being quite ineffective as an 
institution itself. 
Maslowska (2012) also put another thought in this discussion. He gave 
other example of time inconsistency in central bank. Suppose policy makers, as 
well as the government and the central bank, release official regulation to lower 
down the rate of inflation to make it below a certain level, then they change 
direction halfway for another policy purpose, which is increasing the real output 
(GDP) or aggregate output in the short run. It can indeed be avoided by the 
independency of the central bank, but the government’s role in all this, that 
sometimes even doubting the central bank’s decisions creates more burden. The 
example taken from the real life inconsistency can be witnessed from how the 
government handles Asean-China Free Trade Agreement on top of all other 
regulations. 
ACFTA came into the surface on 2002, and began to actualize its activities 
in Indonesia in 2010, while it is still 5 years ahead for countries like Cambodia, 
Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar. It slowly lessers the tariff of trade between Asean 
and China, and increases the import quota on each other. One of the objectives is 
to create a progressive liberalization and to raise international trade, mostly in Asia, 
and also to create a transparent and smooth investment process. Indonesia 
sensed a chance of gain in this agreement through lesser tariff in exporting goods 
to China. But there is never enough surprise in how economy works. From 
Indonesia and China’s export performance from before until after ACFTA (2007-
2011) it showed quite a rise of the export for both countries. However, the gap 
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between the two also started to get wider, as China is the leading man in the game 
while Indonesia still left behind, trying to catch up. The same case happened in the 
import performance, as Indonesia had bigger portions than China in importing 
goods from one another. From this we safely assume that China clearly gains more 
advantage from ACFTA (Directorate General of International Trade, 2010: 
Dewitari, et al, in Herawati, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1.2: The Comparison of Export-Import between Indonesia-China 
Source: Ministry of Industry, 2013 (modified) 
 
 While Figure 1.2 tries to show the start-to-wider gap between China and 
Indonesia’s export-import portions, Figure 1.3 shows the clearer gap between 
them, in percentage. Indonesia gains around 31% from the trade, while it lost 
around 69% from the import amount.  
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Figure 1.3: The Comparison of Export-Import between Indonesia-China in 
Percentage 
Source: Ministry of Industry, 2013 (modified) 
 
 Out of all commodities that being traded through this free trade agreement, 
food is the one that brings out most notable amount of goods cross the sea. Before 
the ACFTA, Indonesian import of food commodities reached 139.507.363 USD, 
while after the agreement, it topped 342.117.050 USD. That is quite a considerable 
rise in the import, which almost double the previous amount. Food plays an 
important role in the free trade game, and the most traded food from China to 
Indonesia are homogenized vegetables prepared as infant (or dietetic) food for 
retail sale, in containers of a net weight not exceeding 250 g (8.83 oz.), not frozen. 
That is quite a tragic way to say that China wins the game in food sales competition, 
given the fact that Indonesia is a tropical country which has the upper hand as the 
natural abundant agricultural resources (Ministry of Industry, 2013). 
 Brilliantly stated, food has the first claim on the budgets of human beings. 
When food prices experience a rise, people with income only slightly above the 
critical level of income tend to reduce their consumption in order to still get essential 
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food items. That is enough to explain that food price, whatever the form of the good 
is, stays paramount for economic agents. Food price also one that fluctuates a lot 
over time, as it influences and at the same time, being influenced by so many 
shocks an external factors, from the most relevant one like harvest problems, until 
the furthest relevance possible, like political issues. The volatility of the price makes 
most central banks tend to leave it out of the inflation rate measurement 
(Candrasekhar, 2013; Davis, 2012). 
 
Figure 1.4: CPI Weights From Three Categories 
Source: Jurnas, 2011 (modified) 
 Figure 1.4 explains that CPI basically weights from three categories, which 
is core inflation, food price, and shock. Core inflation is the only prices being 
included in the inflation rate measurement by most central banks, and non-core 
inflation usually always be the odd one out, because of its heavy volatility. From 
100%, food price holds a 16% part in building the inflation rate. That is, 
undoubtedly, affect the inflation rate quite a big, considering the rest of 66% and 
18% consist of many other form of goods, from oil and electronics to metal goods. 
That can be said that even though it is not being a part of inflation rate 
66%
16%
18%
Core Inflation Food Price Shock
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measurement in many countries, we can not abandon the fact that food price holds 
a significant influence over it, despite its volatility. 
 Figure 1.5 displays more explanation of the comparison between all-item 
inflation and all-food inflation. The green line stands for inflation in general, the blue 
line stands for food, beverages, cigarrette, and tobacco, while the red one is a 
symbol for food ingredients. Food has two colours because of its differences in 
influence over the inflation rate. The most volatile good is food ingredients, even 
though food and beverages also fluctuate more than inflation in general. One 
moment when it is being an exception is after 2009 era, when the global financial 
crisis took place in Indonesia (and almost all other countries). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Inflation: All-Item VS All-Food 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Indonesia, 2013 (modified) 
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 From all the data presented above, we can land to a conclusion that as 
Maslowska and Ueda and Valencia warned before, time inconsistency does 
happen in the real life. Two regulations together do not always get along well. 
When the central bank wants to achieve its inflation target as Indonesia is currently 
adopting inflation targeting network as its policy, and at the same time the 
government attempts to work on another regulation that overlap one another, the 
result can be not so good. Regulation always has a good objective as a main goal, 
but when it prevents other regulation to achieve the sole purpose of it, things can 
turn out ugly afterwards. ACFTA is being created to maximize China and Asean 
countries’ potentials in international trade in the first place, but when it crosses 
other regulation in the process, the government must prevent even worse 
implications in the future. 
 Previous studies had found that central bank credibility indeed heavily 
depends on the inflation, whether or not it matches the target. Popular studies that 
began from Kydland and Prescott, until a giant leap made by Smet and Wouters, 
and recent discoveries never once stated about the relationship between central 
bank credibility and ‘other’ government regulation. Taylor’s discussion of rule vs 
discretion also did not touch the import’s effect to central bank credibility. Ibrahim, 
et al had done a research of ACFTA and admitted that it does indeed have an 
impact to inflation rate, but not as deep, yet. Through this research the author 
wishes to figure out how regulation, which is ACFTA in this case, affects the central 
bank credibility through inflation rate. 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
1. How the regulation affects central bank credibility through inflation rate? 
2. Does a paradox really exist between those two regulations? 
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1.3 Objective 
1. To understand how the regulation affects central bank credibility through 
inflation rate. 
2. To investigate whether or not a paradox really exists between those two 
regulations. 
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Chapter II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Monetary Policy and Credibility 
2.1.1Layered Dimensions of Credibility 
 Henckel, et al (2013) from the Australian National University stated that it 
is actually possible that forecasts do not affect any mechanism of inflation 
whatsoever, in which the changes in the expectations would also be irrelevant. He 
later defines two types of credibility, official target credibility and anchoring 
credibility. When the actual inflation matches the target rate, it can be said that a 
central bank has a high credibility. But when what happens is the opposite, it loses 
its credibility as people would not trust the monetary policy the central bank gives 
anymore. It’s called as the first, while the later refers to the power that the central 
bank hold to match the actual inflation with the target released previously. 
Of course there are some requierements needed. The most important thing 
is the inflation target that the central bank must have that is released to all the 
country’s economics agents in order for them to acknowledge it, and second, the 
central bank must stir its BI rate in order to be able to push the inflation rate towards 
that goal. Henckel, et al (2013) conducted a research that focused mainly about 
how the European central bank actually holds a good deal of official targeting 
credibility. Most of the severe losses happened mainly in countries like Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy and Greece.  
Interesting transmission channel and the effectiveness of dual monetary 
system in Indonesia allured Ascarya (2012) to drown oneself into. One of the 
unique nature of Central Bank of Indonesia is the dual monetary system, where 
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Islamic and Conventional system find their way together to the bank. Whether or 
not this kind of system works, all depends on which is which. The conventional 
system, which means to the monetary system where there are all things prohibited 
in Islam, such as interest rate, has undoubted link to the inflation. It means that 
interest rate has transfer effect to inflation, while the Islamic system rate, which is 
the rate of profit, doesn’t. 
Another unique nature of Central Bank of Indonesia (CBI) is its decision to 
raise the interest rate while all other countries tend to do the opposite. In the 
beginning of this kind of decision being applied, most of the voice came out were 
in a negative note. Though in the end, all the doubts were proven incorrect, 
because it actually eliminates all the negative predictions people were undergoing. 
In fact, this kind of policy lift the country up from sinking in the dark moments back 
in 2005 (when Boediono was still the minister) when the interest rate raised until it 
reached 12%, or when the rise of the global capitalism took place in last 2008. 
Why ‘layered’ dimensions of credibility? Because when we are talking 
about credibility, it’s not just about how actual inflation does not match the inflation 
target, but also the components in it that are, indefinitely, paramount. Different 
system, different type of credibility enhancement. There is also different monetary 
transfer mechanism. What it really means is that a process where begins with the 
policy introduction until where the BI Rate slowly adjust and the result of the policy 
is starting to be shown is called a transfer mechanism. In other words, any changes 
the inflation has that was part of the impact of BI Rate fluctuations is knowingly 
called as the monetary policy transmission mechanism.  It explains the executions 
made by Bank Indonesia through its changes in policy instruments and their target 
while affecting both economic and financial sector before particularly give any 
impact to the inflation rate. We can oversee this mechanism by observing the 
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connections between the central bank, the banking system and financial sector, 
and the real sector. Variables that are affected by this mechanism also indirectly 
have interactions with inflation rate. 
A time lag commonly occurs in the work process of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. The variation in it highly depens on which channel it 
currently works on.  Typically, there is channel that can operate in a flash, more 
than the others. Some channels have been affected drastically through interest 
rate.  Even more so, the speed of monetary policy transmission influence situations 
in the financial and banking sector.  Altough when the banks sense any sign of 
economic turmoil, its response will not be quite as fast anymore, in terms of 
responding the the BI Rate.  Moreover, increasing banks’ capital position will 
ultimately go towards the direction of reducing lending rates and boosting demand 
in credit sector, in which they will not put the lending response in any danger. On 
the other side, economic agents will not automatically increase their demand for 
credit when the lending interest rate is low, if the economic performance is not that 
super.  From this we can conclude that all sectors in economy actually contribute 
to the success or the failure of monetary transmission mechanism. 
Credibility is paramount for Central Bank of Indonesia in succeeding its 
monetary policy, not only for economic agents not reacting outside what is 
expected (and create liquidity trap), or for them not to having backward looking 
behavior instead of the forward looking one, but also for the sake of all the 
regulations. The main reason the regulations are made is to take the inflation under 
control. Not only for it to be under the central bank’s little finger, but also for not 
creating negative trade off between many other macroeconomics variables, such 
as output gap or exchange rate. And this is exactly where the vigilance of the 
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central bank takes over 24/7, because once it has wrong diagnosis and prognosis, 
the effect could be bigger than just a little shock in the economy. 
Output gap is chosen as one of the main indicators that can fully show how 
well the monetary policy works because when it grows bigger as a number (in a 
positive note), the risk of inflation would automatically becomes higher as well. And 
when that happens outside the central bank control, the national welfare would 
also get disturbed. Backward looking behavior tends to be the source of fear for 
central bank because the inflation persistence would be harder to handle and solve 
if people still hold onto the past inflation. The more persistent the rate of inflation 
is, the more difficult it would be for central bank to adjust its level to the original 
target one, or to the requirement of today’s economy. And that would definitely be 
a Dr. Seuss’ nightmare for any country that adopts inflation targeting framework. 
Central Bank of Indonesia can also give its two cents and another 
consideration to the government through Government Expenditure and other form 
of policies which have any relation with this specific goal of the central bank. At the 
same time, the government is also possible to attend the meeting between the 
central bank governor and its elite staffs, though without any vote being taken. 
Therefore, independency implementation is heavily influenced with a reasonable 
and proportional working relationship by both the government and the central bank 
together, and also another elite institutions, which obviously while holding different 
goals each party (Central Bank of Indonesia, 2013). 
 
2.1.2 More to the Credibility: The Main Issue 
 Credibility is always an issue for a central bank, no matter what kind of 
policy it’s currently working on. Tanaka (2013) suggested that it’s not only the 
monetary authority and economic agents’ perspective that determine one’s 
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credibility, but also its financial strength. It is necessary for central bank to conduct 
a monetary policy while being strong financially, in which the bank’s profit affects 
its balance sheet. Credibility of a bank means that economic agents truly believe 
the capability to maintain stable performance throughout time. Even when the 
capital goes towards negative state a credible bank would not immediately go 
bankrupt. Even so, the bank would gradually ran out of liquidity, and over the time 
would deem themselves in dire need of cash, and ultimately will lead themselves 
into bankruptcy. Likewise, the same also applies to central banks. Even though 
central banks have the capacity to create liquidity that they need, so naturally it 
simplifies things for them. 
With that being said, central banks still need to possess capital in some 
way to hold their credibility up. There is this condition that less capital would 
generate less profit.  The advantage of being able to create liquidity can be the 
solution for them whenever problem arises. But it need to be taken into 
consideration that tight monetary policy does not go along well with easing 
monetary policy like that, by producing more liquidity. So, possibility of inflation rate 
getting out of control can still take place if central banks use this strategy in 
conducting their monetary policy, thus put their credibility state in danger. 
In his previous paper, Blinder (1999) suggested that credibility actually only 
exists in theory realm, even though it is believed to also matter in real life. The main 
issue Blinder presented is the difficulty to measure credibility and put it in exact 
number, which reflects a true state of peope’s trust into the central bank. So why, 
and how that happened? Blinder also proposed to try answering why credibility is 
crucial for central bankers, and how to maintain it truthfully. 
No doubt Blinder is one of the greatest economic analysts in this era, 
especially when we talk about cental bank credibility, but when deciding about the 
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definition of credibility, everyone seems to agree that it’s not that easy of a matter 
to determine. Just like Forder (2004) tried to explain once, that the word credibility 
itself hold various meanings behind. Several definition of credibility arises when we 
look into it, in language dictionary. The first word came up was trustworthy, and 
further followed by the word believable. We can safely conclude that credibility is 
actually a matter of trust, or that it reflects the true character of someone and some 
company. In addition, credibility shows how intelligent the policymaker seems to be 
in the eyes of economic agents and how it affects their understanding of each 
monetary policy released by it.  
To create a fairly high credibility, CBI has to dig deeper to its own pocket. 
There is always a price for everything. If institutional transparency needs more 
creative innovations such as technology (in releasing financial reports and the 
smooth information transfer), then the enhancement of a credibility creates what it 
is to be called as monetary cost. Espinoza danTsomocos (2013) introduced this 
kind of cost in last April. According to them, monetary cost in a monetary context 
is a cost that is related with short term interest rate. For example, a cost which 
takes place in between the current interest rate with the trade value, or asset 
prices. 
Essentially, monetary cost acts exactly just like transaction cost. Those two 
are basically the shadow and its owner, as the characteristics and action prediction 
is very similar. Espinoza and Tsomocos (2013) mentioned that if the transaction 
cost is a funding cost or cash withdrawal by intermediaries (such as banks), then 
a monetary cost would be a cost which arise from the policy from which the funding 
decision came out. In the last May, 2013, CBI released a statement that we have 
a financial surplus, which indicated from the decline of the monetary cost. It’s quite 
a news for Indonesia, as from these past three years, the CBI balance sheet is on 
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a deficit situation. This surplus happens because the monetary cost continues to 
decline during 2012, which caused by the rise of the excess of the currency 
absorption through the monetary operation, such as foreign exchange and the 
decline of BI Rate. 
 Lindner and Mihailovci (2013) stated that if central bank is not focusing the 
work on good governance, then it would suffer bigger chances to face natural risks 
such as strategy, economy, operational, and institutional risk, both in long and 
middle run. They later split good governance to three branches, which are: good 
governance for economy and institution controlling, external good governance 
where the central bank conducts a good leadership with other countries, and 
internal good governance where the central bank does various changes in 
institutionally and operationally. 
 
2.2 Inflation, Food Price, and Shock 
2.2.1 The Inevitable Relationship 
 Davis (2013) found that not only core inflation has its effect to the overall 
inflation, which obviously leads us to commodity price, such as food or energy 
price. Non core inflation is often left out by economists trying to measure the rate 
of inflation, as its volatility that happens almost every time. Food and energy price 
are very easily influenced and changed, and are the heaven place for shocks to 
land onto. Not only in Indonesia, shocks in food and energy price happens 
practically everywhere in the world, across nations. Davis used a method that can 
put fluctuations in inflation to the inflation measurement, using the large-scale 
DSGE model, and obviously, incorporate transitory shocks as well. 
 What’s found in the end is quite a shock as well, no pun intended. Davis 
(2013) investigated 6 countries, such as US, UK, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, 
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and Sweden. All six countries showed different results before and after a monetary 
regime changes. When it’s before any change was made in the monetary system, 
the food price (or transitory shocks in food price) had a heavy effect on the rate of 
inflation through the non-core side, while after the regime was changed, it’s not 
anymore. The reason is that the agentsfailes to indentify between trend and cyclical 
inflation, which often happen and wrongly treated as one another. Other reason is 
that after the monetary regime changes, the expected inflation is better anchored. 
One can not go ahead and forget the theory. Bradley, et al (2013) described 
inflation rate as one of the main reason behind human’s economic decisions. 
Whether it is temporary or permanent, this variable stays as important as one’s 
limb. While another time, Labonte (2011) stated that inflation is a fluctuations or a 
stagnation in price level generally in term of the value of money, whether it 
continuously rises or declines. Following this definition, three notes had been made 
to explain the meaning further, and in order not to get confused with other things. 
The first one is that any changes in the price level in general could be referred to 
as inflation. It is not applicable when we talk about one price changes in relative of 
other prices. It is indeed natural for it to happen even though the overall price level 
appears to somewhat stable. Secondly, what being talked here are not assets’ 
prices, but goods and services. Third, any rise or any decline in the level of price 
must be significant and not just happen in an instant, but continuously over time, 
not just in a day or a week worth. 
 Another inflation management by predicting and controlling offered by Basu 
(2011), whose statement was that when a wellinformed responsible government 
or quasi government agency makes an inflation forecast, it can cause the rate of 
inflation in the future to change. This happens because (in the short run) the actual 
inflation rate depends on what people expect the inflation rate to be, partly. Inflation 
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can get worsened by the very fact of higher inflationary expectations and likewise 
prices can be stabilized to a certain extent by virtue of leading people to expect 
that prices will be stable.  
Reseach about this matter also conducted by several, such as Ueda and 
Valencia (2012), Martin (2013), Parkin (2013), and Doroftei and Paun (2013). They 
mainly focused on how central bank independence correlates with the rate of 
inflation. The former one found that time inconsistency used to happen in central 
banks that have two main goals, which are inflation (price) and financial stability 
control. It usually happen when a country have two focuses on excecuting policy 
in monetary sector, and also the output stability. That policy is called macro-
prudential. The meaning of time inconsistency is that when central bank is not 
being consistent at making policy in two different time, ex-ante and ex-post 
transmission process. Central bank fails to narrow down just one single goal on its 
policy making. This can create inflation bias, just as stated above. 
Others, like Martin (2013) found the opposite. Though central bank 
independence indeed lowers the rate of inflation, in the long run it seems things 
aren’t as easy as what they look like. Because the independency of the central 
bank, government can’t control the government bonds strategy to relieve some of 
it’s debt—or even covers certain amount of it—and thus creating public debt 
accumulation. Which end up in a bad note to pay off or accommodate higher 
financial burden, which is as we can expect: inflation. It happens because in the 
long run, money growth rate doesn’t depend on monetary political authority, but 
only in the short run. Martin developed models that explain this specific matter, by 
these equations below: 
In other words, lower seigniorage implies a larger debt. No more money to 
be printed means higher interest rate, and more money to pay for the government 
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debt. And in turn, when the debt becomes higher, the government gets burdened 
even more and thus it triggers money growth rate through the payment process of 
the debt. The monetary policy in the long run remains unaltered. Though it all 
seems confusing at first, it actually can be said to be the opposite: the permanent 
rate of inflation can be controlled if the central bank and its monetary authority are 
fully independent of the government debt. No need to accommodate anything if it 
can actually be achieved in reality. 
Parkin (2013) moved from the theory to practice. He conducted an analysis 
based on actual events and experiments. He suggested two ideas that inflation 
targeting framework might break loose of its anchor, regarding the institutional 
arrangements. The first idea is that inflation targeting is beyond the reach of current 
forecasting capabilities. Everyone is already aware that monetary policy operates 
with a long and variable time lag, and the consensus (in USA, according to Parkin) 
is that it takes about two years for a policy action to influence the inflation rate. And 
between that time, while the policy slowly shows the effect, no one knows what on 
earth would happen and further influence the inflation rate. Second, just as we all 
can conclude by now, there is a substansial portion of uncertainty when we are 
talking about future monetary policy. 
As we all know, inflation has its types. Central Bank of Indonesia is currently 
using the measurement of inflation (through CPI) which divided to 7 separated 
groups, based on the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose 
(COICOP), which are as following: 
1. Food Stuffs 
2. Processed Foods, Beverages and Tobacco 
3. Housing 
4. Clothing 
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5. Health 
6. Education and Sports and  
7. Transportation and Communications. 
Beside the classifications the COICOP gave, Central Bank of Indonesia 
also uses other definition that can be referred to as fluctuations of inflation, which 
published by BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik or The Statictics Bureau). This 
disaggregation is performed by generating an inflation indicator more illustrative of 
the influence of fundamentals. Core inflation, non-core inflation, and administered 
prices are the types of inflation that the Central Bank of Indonesia previously 
defined. 
 
2.3 ACFTA (Asean-China Free Trade Agreement) 
 ACFTA was established and finished in 2010, in January. It was basically 
an agreement of 0% tariff in importing goods from and to China and ASEAN 
countries, during the period time. The agreement was built long before that, as in 
2001 a meeting between China and ASEAN was held in Bandar Sri Begawan, 
Brunei. China offered a 10 years length proposal that was mainly about an 
economic agreement between China and ASEAN countries. The very next year, at 
2002, the contract were signed, and it was called CEC (Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation). From this it is clear that the first intiative came from China’s side, 
despite the ASEAN countries also saw the opportunity in this future agreement 
(Dewitari, et al, in Herawati, 2010).  
 The CEC has three main points, which are liberalization, facility, and 
economic cooperation. The liberalization part includes goods traded, service, and 
investment. More in the liberalization, this agreement also consists on rules of 
maintaining the flexibility in Early Harvest Program, which includes living animals, 
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meat, fish, or another animal products, trees, and vegetables and fruits. Products 
that are listed in this program are further divided into three categories and would 
also get a decline in import tariff, which gradually decreasing, and eventually reach 
zero percent tariff in three years. 
 Even before the ACFTA, it was obvious how the relationship going on 
between China and Indonesia, in terms of the comparison of their import quantities, 
which is overwhelming.The import proportion from China has always been larger 
than Indonesia. Even before the ACFTA, China was the winner in this competition, 
so it’s not a new discovery if Indonesia’s trade balance sheet is deficit compared 
to China’s. From the data found in KADIN (Kamar Dagang and Industry), like an 
organization for trade and industry in Indonesia, in 2009 the manufacture industry 
suffered a decline from 28,1% in 2004 to 27,9% in 2008. Is was forecasted that in 
5 years ahead, investment in manufacture industry will also suffer a decline in 
about US$ 5 billions. From all the middle-and-small industries in Indonesia, around 
85% of the number (which is 16.806 units as a whole, back in 2008) will face 
difficulties and trouble in dealing with the competition after the ACFTA taken place. 
 This problem matters the most for Indonesia, because small-to-medium 
scale industries hold very important part in the economy. That fact can be 
explained through three reasons. One, this kind of industry helps creating job offer 
and employment in Indonesia, one of the most gigantic when we put the matter 
into its population. Not all the job seekers get to work in the office, and they have 
to make a living by themselves, through small-to-medium scale industries. Other 
reason is that it can be done by almost anyone without spesific background 
education required. In this scale of business, it also doesn’t require a ridiculous 
amount of capital, so everyone can start their own without much worry about the 
criteria they should pass and experience they should master. 
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Source: Yusida and Wulandari, 2013 (modified) 
Figure 2.1: Response on The Impact of ACFTA From Manufacture Industry 
 From the survey held by Indonesian HSBC from Business Indonesia in 
2010 (in Yusida and Wulandari, 2013), most of the participants that came from 
small-to-medium scale industry felt no significant impact of this ACFTA. The 
amount was quite a number, which is 55% from total. Around 15% said they felt a 
difference and an impact through this agreement, while the other 30% is still on the 
grey side, as they will still see through the moment, what this agreement will bring 
to them in the next 2-3 years ahead. From all the data shown above, the fact does 
not fit the theories on how well this ACFTA will do for Indonesian economy, and it’s 
still 7 years ahead from now. 
 
2.4 Relationship between All Variables: How Regulation Affects the Central 
Bank Credibility through Food Price 
 The central bank, as well as the monetary policy, holds responsibility for 
the stabilization of the money supply of a country. Whether the fluctuation happens 
due to the inevitable shock that can not be avoided, or simply the miscalculation 
on the government side, the duty still lies on the central bank’s hands. The 
credibility of the central bank can be seen through the gap between the inflation 
target and the actual inflation. The higher the gap is, the lower the credibility would 
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be. Credibility in this matter relates to how economic agents behave towards the 
monetary policy. Public would, hypothetically speaking, follow the instruction the 
central bank gives if the credibility is considered high enough. 
 Unfortunately, things are not always happening according to one’s 
expectation. Or at least, not as smoothly.Funny enough, the reason sometimes 
comes from the same direction: government policy. When the central bank focuses 
on two goals that is called as macro-prudential policy, it has high probability of 
losing sight in what really matters, which in economics terms is called time-
inconsistency. Simple example would be like when the central bank tries to 
stabilize both monetary and fiscal side of a country, while trying to maintain output 
at the certain level. Inflation bias can happen when the government increases the 
money level in the country to get a satisfied rise number of output, when the central 
bank aims to lower the inflation rate to reach the target level. This kind of clash 
doesn’t only happen one or twice. 
 Another set of examples would be the AFCTA matter. The problem arises 
when the government put domestic business at a stake by implementing quota 
regulation that clearly advantage other country, and in this case, China. 
Government decision seems to clash with each other, and sometimes even makes 
the other overshadowed, overlapped. At the same time, trying to maintain a healthy 
domestic businessmen going strong while making agreement with China and 
Asean to a “free” trade looks ridiculous. Why inflation in food price matters in 
Indonesia? It’s actually not only in Indonesia, but food price does make several 
countries, even developed ones, to think twice every time they want to estimate 
overall inflation, as it can be put in the variables as a whole, due to the volatile 
nature of it. 
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Chapter III 
HYPOTHESIS FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Conceptual Framework 
In the previous section it’s already mentioned about how the inflation rate 
holds a paramount responsibility for the credibility of a central bank, as it’s the main 
reason people can say the bank is credible enough or not. One that determines a 
central bank’s credibility, though, is not only inflation rate. The independency, 
transfer mechanism efficiency, and even the financial budgeting of a monetary 
policy each have its role in maintaining a good and credible central bank. 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework 
 
An independent central bank can make the goal stays in the line even 
though the government might would want to interrupt in some way. Time 
inconsistency plays some parts here, as it occurs when there are two goals and 
two mainsets implemented at the same time, and it can alter the mechanism of the 
ACFTA Regulation
Food Price Inflation
Credibility
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policy and eventually make the result so biased and unsuccessful. This is the 
importance of a central bank independency. 
 So, one thing has been cleared for now. Inflation rate, or in this case, the 
gap between actual and target rate, holds responsibility for central bank’s credibility 
in a way. But what makes a matched actual inflation rate with the one the central 
bank released officially? What other factor can alter the actual rate of inflation? 
However odd it might sound, regulation can come across as an obstacle for the 
monetary policy sector, say, inflation control. When the regulation from the 
government focusing more on the output and makes the inflation lowered down, it 
can ruin the initial goal of the central bank. Low inflation rate is not always the 
answer of all problems. A stable rate is what the country needs, and as long it is 
under control and can bend as the central bank want, all will be well. But regulation, 
in this case is ACFTA, turns out to be an obstacle for the credibility maintaining, 
because it makes domestic price increases, which in other words, inflation 
happens.  
 ACFTA is like sword with two sides of edge. Wulandari and Yusida (2013) 
found that since Indonesia established 0% tariff in 2010, the country were flooded 
with China’s goods and eventually the domestic business went down. Not only the 
sales of the domestic goods that was decreasing, the price also increasing due to 
the international trade agreement. Industries that suffered the most from it were 
woods, steel, machines, alumunium, food and beverages, art sculptures, camera 
and optical tools, and other chemical industries. Indonesia was not ready to 
challenge a one-on-one stage with China’s market, because quite a number of 
domestic industries still lacking in competition mainly because of the asymmetric 
information. 
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Figure 3.2: The Relationship between Regulation, Inflation, and Credibility 
 
 By adding regulation through quota to the former equation and model of 
the central bank credibility constructed by Waluyo, et al (2011), the hypothesis 
model goes to another form below. 
 
Figure 3.3: Hypothesis Model 
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3.2 Hypothesis 
 This part will elaborate explanation of an observation this thesis would like 
to conduct. By hypothesis it means the situation in which the researcher has 
prepared a theory-based hypothesis beforehand and make sure to discover 
evidences to support the theory or to do the opposite. Most of the central bank 
credibility research include null hypothesis on the paper, but this thesis aim not to 
fly to the same direction, because it’s not a commonly accepted hypothesis that 
this thesis would like to reject, prove, or nullify. It’s still uncommon whether or not 
regulation actually relates negatively to the central bank credibility, as this 
discussion has never been done before in this light. 
 Hypothesis states a relationship between dependent variable and 
independent variable. Dependent variable is the one the model wants to explain, 
that influenced, though heavily or not still can not be decided early on, by the latter. 
It measures the event currently being explained. Based on the concept above, the 
hypothesis framework in this research are as follows: 
H1   : variable of future actual inflation, past actual inflation, and dummy of 
ACFTA each has significant impact on the increase or the decrease of the 
Bank Indonesia’s present inflation rate. 
H2   : variable of regulation (through quota) has significant impact, negatively, 
on the fluctuations of the present inflation rate. 
H3   : variable of the past credibility has significant impact on the up and down 
of the credibility. 
H4   : variable of inflation deviation (past actual inflation minus inflation target) 
has significant impact on the fluctuations of the credibility. 
H5   : variable of present inflation rate has significant impact on the fluctuations 
of the credibility. 
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 Like stated before, the regulation in this matter comes in as the import quota 
after the ACFTA, during 2007-2012 period. This research would limit the quota only 
in food items, as the main concern in the research is also limited in that sector. 
That is due to the condition in Indonesia that a non-core inflation is represented by 
food prices, as it keeps changing all the time. Food price is often not being included 
to the measurement of the rate of inflation because its volatility that is difficult to be 
measured. Through the quota, it can be seen how the government leans heavily 
on the foreign goods after the ACFTA was concluded. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Research Type 
Despite intense research for over the last 31 years, full agreement on using 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) as a perfect model to forecast 
and make policy advice has not been reached. However in this chapter, a 
methodology to estimate the relationship between central bank credibility and 
regulation through inflation rate is presented, using the model in question. 
Specifically it is analyzed through how the measurement of regulation, proxied by 
import quota, impacts the inflation through food price, in which the volatility is 
common for being the cause that non-core inflation is harder to estimate and put 
into usual inflation estimation. The type of research used by this thesis is 
explanatory using hypothesis tests. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The location of the research will be 
first introduced, then the source of the data, following by methodology, variables, 
definition of the operational variables, and finally the order of the analysis 
technique. 
 
4.2 Research Location 
This research took place in Central Bank of Indonesia because the 
secondary data was taken from Central Bank of Indonesia, with partly obtained 
from Central Bureau of Statistic (BPS), and World Economic Outlook IMF 
(International Monetary Fund). This research location is chosen because of several 
reasons. The first reason, Central Bank of Indonesia is the institution which 
provides official inflation rate for both the initial target and the actual one, as well 
as the expected inflation rate. The second would be that the data provided in 
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Central Bank of Indonesia are complete and easy to get. Lastly, there are few data 
in which scholars can not conduct the survey by themselves because of the size 
of the scale, such as survey of the expected inflation and the perception of the 
central bank credibility to around 2000 companies as economic agents. The 
research period is limited only during 2007-2013, before the ACFTA that the quota 
regulation being held and after the agreement being officially made in Indonesia. 
 
4.3 Source of Data 
The data gathered in this research is secondary, which published officially 
by Central Bank of Indonesia, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Central 
Bureau of Statistics (BPS), from 2007 to 2013. The type of the data obtained is 
different each kind, because there are several that released monthly, quarterly, 
even yearly. But all the data is planned to be organized as quarterly, respectively. 
All the data consisted of inflation rate (both actual and target), credibility rate, and 
import quota. The reason why output gap is not listed in this line up is because this 
research focused mainly on the credibility shown through inflation rate and 
regulation, as in import quota.  
 
4.4  Data Analysis 
Econometrics analysis in this research is using Simultaneous Equations 
Models, due to the relationship the dependent variables have on each other. There 
are two approaches to estimate parameters in simultaneous equations. First is 
single equation method or what is known as limited information methods, which 
are Indirect Least Square (ILS), Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS), and Limited 
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML). As for the second, it’s system method that 
is known as Full Information Method, or Three Stage Least-Square (3SLS) and Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) (Jonaidi, 2012). 
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The method of three stage least squares estimation, also the one being 
used in this thesis, is decided to be one the most efficient method in popular works 
because it is known to be fully efficient since it takes into account all available 
information in the estimation of the coefficients of a model and then forms weights 
and re-estimates all the coefficients of the model using the estimated weighting 
matrix (Umoh, et al, 2012). That being said, the primary concern of this method is 
not the R-Square, but the constant characters of the coefficients. The use of this 
approach is mostly practiced for over identified equations. 
The advantage of this estimator over 2SLS is that not only it’s consistent, 
but in general it will be more efficient than 2SLS, as it takes into account the 
presence of other equations in the model. This is done by recognizing that there 
will be a contemporary variance structure between the error terms in each of the 
structural equations. To put it short, 3SLS adds error terms all up, which 2SLS 
doesn’t, so the result is more valid and makes more sense than the latter. This 
procedure uses the method of instrumental variables to produce consistent 
estimates in the presence of endogenous explanatory variables and it uses 
generalized least squares to account for correlation in the error terms across 
equations to produce more efficient estimates (Greene, 2003). 
Estimation on central bank credibility will be performed to observe 
relationship between variables that influence the dependent one. The estimation 
order is as initial test first, and it will be done using unit root test through ADF Test 
(Augmented Dickey Fuller) and trend identification. ADF Test is used to identify 
whether or not the model is already stationer in level, which means that the 
distribution of the data is in the normal state. After that Durbin Watson Test takes 
place, as it is the most common test against the autocorrelation of errors in 
regression models (Dufour and Dagenais, 1984). 
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 The step of the estimation is as follows: 
1. Stationary Test 
2. Normality Test 
 
4.5 Definition of variable 
 Variables that are being used in this research revolve around in the 
monetary policy sector, except for the two main concerns: Dummy and Quota, 
which both stand as proxy for the government regulation, which is ACFTA. 
Table 4.1: DEFINITION OF VARIABLE 
Name Symbol Definition Description 
Central bank 
credibility 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷 𝑡 1. Perception of the 
central bank 
credibility presented 
in certain number 
from 0 to 1. 
2. The data is 
obtained through 
survey held by 
Central Bank of 
Indonesia to 2000 
companies as 
economic agent’s 
representatives. 
0 = full credibility 
1 = no credibility 
Inflation target 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑟 Inflation target 
released officially by 
Central Bank of 
Indonesia. The data 
is taken quarterly 
from 2007 to 2013. 
Inflation target is 
released monthly by 
Central Bank of 
Indonesia, but is taken 
quarterly in this 
research due to Taylor 
Rule theory. 
Actual inflation 𝐶𝑃𝐼 Actual inflation that 
released officially by 
Central Bank of 
Indonesia. The data 
is taken quarterly for 
period 2007-2013. 
Actual inflation is 
released monthly by 
Central Bank of 
Indonesia, but is taken 
quarterly in this 
research due to Taylor 
Rule theory. 
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ACFTA (ASEAN 
Free Trade 
Agreement) 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 Dummy stands for 
the period before or 
after ACFTA. It 
becomes a proxy of 
government 
regulation. 
0 = before ACFTA 
1 = after ACFTA 
Import quota 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎 Import quota for food 
that becomes a proxy 
of government 
regulation. It is taken 
from Ministry of 
Industry during 2007-
2013, in the form of 
differences in quota. 
 
Error term  𝜀𝑡 Disturbance/error 
term 
 
 
4.6. Model Specification 
4.6.1. Inflation and Central Bank Credibility 
According to previous 3SLS theory discussed above, the specification for 
central bank credibility with order of variable (variable ordering in 3SLS system) in 
this research is as follows: 
First equation: 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡 = ∝  + 𝛽1𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛽1) 𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡+1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +  𝜀1𝑡 …..(4.1.1) 
Second equation: 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡 = ∝  + 𝛽1𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛽1) 𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡+1 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎 +  𝜀2𝑡…….. (4.1.2) 
 
Third equation: 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷 𝑡 = ∝  + 𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷 𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑡−1) +  𝛽3𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡  +
𝛽4(𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑡−1)(𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡) +  𝜀3𝑡 ……………………………… (4.2) 
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Where: 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷 𝑡 = central bank credibility 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑟  = inflation target released officially by Central Bank of Indonesia 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡  = inflation rate in the present date 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1  = past performance of inflation rate 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡+1  = future performance of inflation rate 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦  = dummy variable, in which 0=before ACFTA and 1=after ACFTA 
𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎 = differences/gap between previous and present number of import 
quota 
 𝜀𝑡   = disturbance error/error term 
Credibility equation is determined by the deviation of inflation target, which 
is (𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑡−1) and the dummy variable, in which the regulation is proxied 
into two categories, 0 stands for before ACFTA took place, and 1 stands for after 
the ACFTA being held officially in Indonesia. In equation (4.2) the regulation takes 
form as the differences between import quota from time to time, which is presented 
as variable𝛽3𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎. 
 
4.6.2. Identification Test 
An equation can be described as: 
- Under identified, if the predetermine variables in the equation are less than 
the endogen variables (K-k < m) 
- Over identified, if the predetermine variables in the equation are less than 
the endogen variables (K-k > m) 
- Just/exactly identified, if the predetermine variables in the equation are less 
than the endogen variables (K-k > m) 
Where:  
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- K = exogenous variables in the model 
- k  = exogenous variables in every equation in the model 
- m = endogenous variables 
According to the identification rules above, equation (1.1) have m that 
equals to 1, K=9, and k=4. If we put it this way, it would be K-k > m-1, which 9-4 > 
1-1 resulted in 5>0, so the equation (1.1) is indicated as overidentified. That means 
there is an omitted variable, or there is an important variable that is not yet being 
included in the model. As for the equation (1.2), it is clear that m=1, K=9. k=4, 
which 9-4 > 1-1 resulted in 5>0, so the equation (1.2) is indicated as overidentified, 
the same as equation (1.1). For the last equation, m=2, K=9, and k=3, so 9-3 > 6-
1, which 4>1, so the equation (2) is also indicated as overidentified. Thus, as 
explained above, it is best to use 3SLS as the estimating method. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Hypothesis Test 
5.1.1 Stationary Test 
Stationary test is conducted to observe whether the data in this thesis is 
stationary or not. If it is the latter, first differential treatment is needed, in order to 
get the data to be stationary. In this research the unit root test with Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) method is being used. 
 
Table 5.1: Unit Root Test Result Using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test 
 
Variable ADF Statistics 
(level) 
ADF Statistics (first 
difference) 
𝑪𝑹𝑬𝑫 𝒕 2.365903 7.337071 
𝑪𝑹𝑬𝑫 𝒕−𝟏 2.139706 6.404661 
 (𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕−𝟏
− 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝒕−𝟏) 
2.127316 6.954721 
𝑸𝒖𝒐𝒕𝒂 2.283199 7.786080 
𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕 2.094807 4.628765 
𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕−𝟏 2.315180 5.827591 
(𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕−𝟏 −
𝑪𝑷𝑰𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝒕−𝟏)* 
(𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕) 
1.507738 5.515575 
𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕+𝟏 3.843067 - 
 
Notes:  
Critical value 1% : -3.525618  
5% : -2.902953  
10% : -2.588902  
*Significant in all three α, 1%, 5%, dan 10%  
 
Based on the Tabel 1, it can be stated that all variables are stationary in first 
difference, except for CPI t+1, which is stationary in level. 
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5.1.2 Normality Test 
The purpose of the normality test is to find out whether the data being used 
in the research is normally distributed or not, in order to not have the result as being 
biased. It also aims to select which statistical test that will be conducted. To do the 
normality test, Jarque-Bera test is being used and the result can be shown from 
Figure 5.1. The normality test using Jarque-Bera came out <5%, which means the 
distribution of the data using in the regression is normally distributed. As for the P-
value, it’s >5%, which means the null hypothesis of the distribution of the data 
being normally distributed is not rejected. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Normality Test Using Jarque-Bera Statistics 
 
5.2 Inflation Equation Estimation 
The first equation that will be explained is inflation equation, which is 
divided by two: inflation-dummy equation, and inflation-import quota equation. The 
result displayed the three equations altogether, which each coefficient named as 
how it was computed in the estimation, from C(1) to C(13). However, the 
0
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Mean      -5.04e-16
Median   0.008381
Maximum  1.247753
Minimum -1.411862
Std. Dev.   0.577961
Skewness  -0.602522
Kurtosis   3.359700
Jarque-Bera  4.744541
Probability  0.093269
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interpretation would be separated into two groups, first is inflation equation, which 
consists of two equations, and central bank credibility as the last model discussed 
in the estimation result analysis. This section talked about the first two equations: 
inflation equation. 
 
Table 5.2: Three Stage Least Square Inflation Equation 
 
System: SYS02    
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares  
Date: 12/10/19   Time: 11:15   
Sample: 2007M01 2012M12   
Included observations: 72   
Total system (balanced) observations 432  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C(1) -3.724294 0.048018 -77.56039 0.0000 
C(2) -0.148389 0.023074 -6.431104 0.0000 
C(3) -0.200615 0.021883 -9.167519 0.0000 
C(4) -0.232195 0.040107 -5.789437 0.0000 
C(5) -3.723931 0.048319 -77.06984 0.0000 
C(6) -0.128110 0.026494 -4.835370 0.0000 
C(7) -0.220496 0.025127 -8.775179 0.0000 
C(8) -0.020499 0.005453 -3.759239 0.0002 
C(9) 202.4794 147.4692 1.373028 0.1705 
C(10) 0.830968 0.425023 1.955114 0.0512 
C(11) 68.99966 50.09001 1.377513 0.1691 
C(12) 71.30295 53.38555 1.335623 0.1824 
C(13) 24.19377 18.10201 1.336524 0.1821 
     
     
Determinant residual covariance 3.59E-16   
     
     
     
Equation: LNCPI=C(1)+C(2)*LNCPI_T+C(3)*LNCPI_T1+C(4)*DUMMY  
Instruments: LNCPI LNCPI_T LNCPI_T1 DUMMY LNIMPORT 
        LNCPI_T_LNCPI_TAR_T C   
Observations: 72   
R-squared 0.321508    Mean dependent var -2.881623 
Adjusted R-squared 0.291575    S.D. dependent var 0.400511 
S.E. of regression 0.337102    Sum squared resid 7.727361 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.110739    
     
Equation: LNCPI=C(5)+C(6)*LNCPI_T+C(7)*LNCPI_T1+C(8)*LNIMPORT  
Instruments: LNCPI LNCPI_T LNCPI_T1 DUMMY LNIMPORT 
        LNCPI_T_LNCPI_TAR_T C   
Observations: 72   
R-squared 0.151992    Mean dependent var -2.881623 
Adjusted R-squared 0.114580    S.D. dependent var 0.400511 
S.E. of regression 0.376868    Sum squared resid 9.657982 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.070024    
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Equation: LNCRED=C(9)+C(10)*LNCRED_T+C(11)*LNCPI_T_LNCPI_TAR 
        _T+C(12)*LNCPI+C(13)*LNCPI_T_LNCPI_TAR_T*LNCPI  
Instruments: LNCPI LNCPI_T LNCPI_T1 DUMMY LNIMPORT 
        LNCPI_T_LNCPI_TAR_T C   
Observations: 72   
R-squared -2.327448    Mean dependent var -1.431369 
Adjusted R-squared -2.526101    S.D. dependent var 0.818424 
S.E. of regression 1.536829    Sum squared resid 158.2436 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.305317    
     
Equation: C(2)*LNCPI_T+C(3)*LNCPI_T1-(1)   
Instruments: LNCPI LNCPI_T LNCPI_T1 DUMMY LNIMPORT 
        LNCPI_T_LNCPI_TAR_T C   
Observations: 72   
S.E. of regression 0.133203    Sum squared resid 1.242011 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.068865    
     
Equation: C(6)*LNCPI_T+C(7)*LNCPI_T1-(1)   
Instruments: LNCPI LNCPI_T LNCPI_T1 DUMMY LNIMPORT 
        LNCPI_T_LNCPI_TAR_T C   
Observations: 72   
S.E. of regression 0.132077    Sum squared resid 1.221102 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.069363    
     
Equation: C(1)-(C(5))    
Instruments: LNCPI LNCPI_T LNCPI_T1 DUMMY LNIMPORT 
        LNCPI_T_LNCPI_TAR_T C   
Observations: 72   
S.E. of regression 0.000368    Sum squared resid 9.49E-06 
     
     
 
5.2.1 The Impact Before and After ACFTA on Inflation 
The first equation aimed to show the impact of the ACFTA to the inflation 
rate, as a Dummy. It explained the implication it has on the rate, before and after 
the period has taken place. The significance level in the result is divided into three, 
which are 5%, 10%, and 20%. Any number above 20% of the coefficient’s 
significance level is considered not significant. 
 
Table 5.3: Significance Level of Variables on First Equation 
Variable Coefficient P Value 
𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕−𝟏 -0.148389 0.0000*** 
𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕+𝟏 -0.200615 0.0000*** 
𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 -0.232195 0.0000*** 
***Significant in α 0.05 
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It is shown from the estimation result that inflation is affected significantly 
by all 3 independent variables, which are the inflation rate in the previous time 
(𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1), inflation rate in the future time (𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡+1), and the period before and after 
ACFTA (𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦).The interesting thing is that all variables have a negative impact 
on inflation rate. The probability for Dummy is not fully significant (0) because no 
such variable is pure without any white noise interruption, so instead we put it to 
be 0.00001. 
The equation would be shown as: 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡 =  −3.724294 − 0.148389 𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 + (1 − (−0.200615)) 𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡+1
− 0.232195 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
And after the further estimation it would be shown as: 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡 =  −3.724294 − 0.148389 𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 + 1.200615  𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡+1 − 0.232195 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
The previous inflation rate has a significant negative impact on present 
inflation rate. It means that when the past inflation rate increases for 1 unit (or 1 
percent, in this case), the inflation rate would decrease for 0.148389 unit.The 
significance level of previous inflation rate is 0.0%, clearly <5%, thus the H1 is 
accepted, so it implied that the past performance of inflation rate significantly 
affected the present inflation rate negatively. 
On the contrary, the future inflation rate has a significant positive impact on 
present inflation rate. It means when the future inflation rate increases for 1 unit (or 
1 percent, in this case), the inflation rate would also increase for 1.200615  unit. 
The significance level of future inflation rate is 0.0%, clearly <5%, thus the H1 is 
also accepted, which explained that the future inflation rate significantly affect the 
present inflation rate positively. 
As for Dummy variable, which explain the impact before and after ACFTA, 
it has a significant negative impact on present inflation rate. It means the period 
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before ACFTA affects the inflation rate more than the period after ACFTA.  There 
is an decrease of 0.232195 unit for inflation rate, before the ACFTA has taken place 
in the country. The significance level of the Dummy variable is 0.00%, clearly <5%, 
thus the H1 is accepted (the period after ACFTA significantly affects the present 
inflation rate in a negative manner). 
While knowing that, it should be noticed that the Dummy here stands for 
the period before and after ACFTA, as a whole. That would mean it reflected the 
regulation as in all import and export policy, including food import, but not limited 
as. And the result told us that as a regulation in general, ACFTA did give a positive 
impact to the present inflation rate, as it lowered down the latter. Although either 
the import or export regulation that actually did the good job here, we still can not 
make sure of that. 
It also should be taken into consideration that the R-Square is quite low for 
common regression results, which in this case is only 32.15%. That could mean 
quite a low impact for most interpretations. But as the method being used here is 
Three Stage Least Square (3SLS), the exact number of R-Square does not 
become the most important part of the research. The R-square derived from 3SLS 
is not comparable to the R-square derived in common regression like Ordinary 
Least Square since the regression sum of squares and the error sum of squares 
do not sum to the total corrected sum of squares, and the R-square is not bounded 
by zero (Greene, 2003). Instead of R-Square, the main concern in the 3SLS 
estimation method is the constant character of the coefficients. 
 
5.2.2 The Impact of Import Quota of ACFTA on Inflation 
The second equation is made to show the impact of the ACFTA to the 
inflation rate, as Quota. It explained the implication it has on the rate, through the 
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import quota, especially in food. Just as before, the significance level in the result 
is divided into three, which are 5%, 10%, and 20%.  
Table 5.4: Significance Level of Variables on Second Equation 
Variable Coefficient P Value 
𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕−𝟏 -0.128110 0.0000*** 
𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕+𝟏 -0.220496 0.0000*** 
𝑸𝒖𝒐𝒕𝒂 -0.020499 0.0002*** 
*Significant in α 0.20 
**Significant in α 0.10 
***Significant in α 0.05 
It is shown from the estimation result that inflation is affected significantly 
by all 3 independent variables, which are the inflation rate in the previous time 
(𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1), inflation rate in the future time (𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡+1), and the proxy for government 
regulation, which is import quota of ACFTA (𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎). The interesting thing is that 
only previous performance of inflation has a negative impact on present inflation 
rate, the other two, which are future inflation rate and the import quota, both have 
positive impact.Just as before, the probability for import quota is not fully significant 
(0.0000) because no such variable is pure without any white noise interruption, so 
instead we put it to be 0.00001. 
The equation would be shown as: 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡 =  −3.723931 − 0.128110 𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 + (1 − (−0.220496))𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡+1
−  0.020499 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎 
And after the further estimation it would be shown as: 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡 =  −3.723931 − 0.128110 𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 + 1.220496 𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡+1 −  0.020499 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎 
On the second equation of inflation, the past performance of inflation also 
has a negative impact on present inflation. It implies that when the past inflation 
rate increases for 1 unit (or 1 percent, in this case), the inflation rate would 
decrease for 0.128110 unit. The significance level of previous inflation rate is 0.0%, 
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clearly <5%, thus the H1 is accepted, which means that the past performance of 
inflation rate significantly affect the present inflation rate negatively. 
For the second variable, it is shown that the future inflation rate has a 
significant positive impact on present inflation rate. It means when the future 
inflation rate increases for 1 unit (or 1 percent, in this case), the inflation rate would 
also increase for 1.220496   unit. The significance level of future inflation rate is 
0.0%, clearly <5%, thus the H1 is accepted, and it means that the future inflation 
rate significantly affect the present inflation rate positively. 
The last variable, which proxied as the government regulation (ACFTA) 
showed a positive impact towards present inflation rate.It means when the import 
quota increases for 1 unit (or 1 percent, in this case), the inflation rate would also 
decrease for 0.020499  unit. The significance level of import quota is 0.02%, clearly 
<1%, thus the H2 is accepted, so it is agreed that the import quota significantly 
affected the present inflation rate positively. 
 
The result, as we can see, gave a different light compared to the previous 
proxy of ACFTA. Before, the Dummy showed a negative impact to inflation, which 
means that it actually lowered down the rate, and all things being equal, is a good 
sign. But with quota as the proxy of the regulation, is seemed that the result is not 
the same. And we should take notice that it only happened regarding in the food 
sector, as the import quota used as the data is only the food import quota. The 
conclusion we can draw here is that ACFTA has a negative impact on the inflation 
rate through its food import, but a positive impact as a whole regulation. 
This result also showed a link that exists between fiscal and monetary 
sector, through this regulation. In this case it seems that the relationship is 
negative, as one brings down the other. But it can not be overlooked that it only 
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happened in the food sector of the policy. Still, food has a big part in the inflation 
rate volatility, though in the end it is being left out in the measurement process. 
And for technical matter, similar thing also happened like in the previous discovery, 
the R-Square for second inflation equation also reached a low level, which is 
36.50%. The same thing also applied here. 
 
 
5.3 Credibility Equation Estimation 
The last equation is the one that 3SLS method intends to elaborate the 
most. In short, it is the main part of the simultaneous equation.  
Table 5.5: Three Stage Least Square Credibility Equation 
System: SYS02    
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares  
Date: 12/10/19   Time: 11:15   
Sample: 2007M01 2012M12   
Included observations: 72   
Total system (balanced) observations 432  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C(1) -3.724294 0.048018 -77.56039 0.0000 
C(2) -0.148389 0.023074 -6.431104 0.0000 
C(3) -0.200615 0.021883 -9.167519 0.0000 
C(4) -0.232195 0.040107 -5.789437 0.0000 
C(5) -3.723931 0.048319 -77.06984 0.0000 
C(6) -0.128110 0.026494 -4.835370 0.0000 
C(7) -0.220496 0.025127 -8.775179 0.0000 
C(8) -0.020499 0.005453 -3.759239 0.0002 
C(9) 202.4794 147.4692 1.373028 0.1705 
C(10) 0.830968 0.425023 1.955114 0.0512 
C(11) 68.99966 50.09001 1.377513 0.1691 
C(12) 71.30295 53.38555 1.335623 0.1824 
C(13) 24.19377 18.10201 1.336524 0.1821 
     
     
Determinant residual covariance 3.59E-16   
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Table 5.6: Significance Level of Variables on Third Equation 
 Variable Coefficient P value 
𝑪𝑹𝑬𝑫 𝒕−𝟏 0.830968 0.0512** 
(𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕−𝟏 − 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝒕−𝟏) 68.99966 0.1691* 
𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕 71.30295 0.1824* 
(𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕−𝟏 − 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝒕−𝟏) ∗ (𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕) 24.19377 0.1821* 
*Significant in α 0.2 
**Significant in α 0.1 
The result is as follows: 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷 𝑡 =  202.4794 +  0.830968 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷 𝑡−1 + 68.99966 (𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑡−1)
+ 71.30295 𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡 + 24.19377 (𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑡−1)(𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡) 
 Based on the result all variable has a positive impact on central bank 
credibility. The reason is that the central bank credibility is highly influenced by 
inflation performance and the forward-looking behaviour of the economic agents. 
This can provide an evidence against the past discoveries that the behaviour of 
the economic agents in Indonesia tends to be backward-looking. Thus, H3 is 
accepted. 
 Putting this aside, the other variables have significance level below 20%. 
The inflation deviation or inflation gap has 16.91% probability, the present inflation 
rate (𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡) has 18.24%, and the interactional variable ((𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 −
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑡−1)(𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑡)) has 18.21%. All three variables also have positive impact on 
central bank credibility, simultaneously. 
 The first variable (after past performance of credibility), the inflation gap, 
affect the central bank credibility positively. It means when the inflation rate 
deviates from the target and the gap increases 1 unit (or 1 percent, in this case), 
the central bank credibility would also increase for about 0.830968 unit. It accepts 
H4, which implied that the further the inflation rate moves away from its target level, 
the lower the central bank credibility would resulted. 
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 The most important variable in this equation, the present inflation rate, 
reflects the impact of government regulation (ACFTA) to central bank credibility, 
indirectly. The inflation rate has a positive impact on credibility, so it means that 
when the inflation increases for 1 unit (or 1 percent, in this case), the central bank 
credibility would also increase for 71.30295  unit. It also fits H5, that implied 
government regulation (ACFTA) affects the central bank credibility through inflation 
rate. The period after ACFTA and the increase of import quota in ACFTA does 
affect central bank credibility though in fact, in a positive manner. 
 The last variable, the interactional variable between the inflation gap and 
the present inflation showed a positive relationship as well. It reflected the 
relationship of the inflation gap and the government regulation through the present 
inflation rate. Positive sign meant that the higher the inflation gap and the present 
inflation rate, the higher the credibility would also be. When it increases by 1 unit, 
the central bank credibility would decrease by 24.19377  unit. It also fits the 
hypothesis, because even though what it should be is the more out of control the 
inflation rate is (high deviation), the more the central bank loses its credibility, the 
rate still has significant impact after all. 
But why does it reflect otherwise, though? We should not forget citizen’s 
share of information regarding government regulation and monetary circumstances 
is relatively low, so therefore the credibility though is indeed affected by past 
credibility, does not entirely reflect all knowledge that Indonesian citizen has held 
so far. 
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5.4 The Comparison With Previous Researches 
As the topic about the implications of government regulation with ACFTA 
as a proxy, to central bank credibility in Indonesia has never been conducted 
before, the comparison goes to only some parts of the result in the thesis. The 
variables for the inflation equations and the credibility equation showed similar 
performance with previous researches, as a whole. 
 
Table 5.7: Comparison With Previous Research 
Exogenous 
Variable 
Impact to Endogenous 
Variable 
Previous Research 
𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕−𝟏 Negative Waluyo, et al (2011) 
𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕+𝟏 Positive Waluyo, et al (2011) 
𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 Negative Ibrahim, et al (2010)  briefly 
mentioned 
𝑸𝒖𝒐𝒕𝒂 Positive Davis (2012), Martin (2013), 
Parkin (2013)  inflation and 
food price 
𝑪𝑹𝑬𝑫 𝒕−𝟏 Positive Waluyo, et al (2011) 
(𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕−𝟏
− 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝒕−𝟏) 
Negative Waluyo, et al (2011) 
𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕 Negative Waluyo, et al (2011), Henckel, 
et al (2013), Tanaka (2013) 
(𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕−𝟏
− 𝑪𝑷𝑰𝒕𝒂𝒓 𝒕−𝟏)
∗ (𝑪𝑷𝑰 𝒕) 
Negative - 
 
 Ibrahim, et al (2010) already mentioned about the negative impact that 
ACFTA has on inflation rate, but it was only briefly discussed. No other research 
has ever talked about this topic yet, not as a whole regulation or in parts, like in 
this thesis, which did both. All variables beside proxy of ACFTA has similar result 
to inflation rate, according to previous researches. The same did not happened 
with all variables for credibility equation, excluding the interactional variable. 
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5.5 The Relationship Between Government Regulation and Central Bank 
Credibility 
 Discoveries found in this research are highly focused on the government 
regulation’s impact on the central bank credibility. There are three equations, which 
the first two reflected the government regulation side through ACFTA to inflation 
rate, and the last reflected the impact it has on the central bank credibility. 
From three equations above, it should be made clear that inflation rate and 
credibility does get affected by ACFTA. The import quota showed that it mattered, 
because the inflation rate went up when the quota increased, although the period 
before and after showed an opposite statement. The period before the ACFTA 
showed more significant impact on the credibility, than the period after. As the 
quota used as the data in this research is limited to food sector only, it tells us how 
the increasing quota (after ACFTA has taken place) affected the inflation rate 
through non-core sector. 
The volatility of the food price is one the main reason why the food price is 
not being included in the inflation measurement by Bank Indonesia. Food price is 
often not being included to the measurement of the rate of inflation because its 
volatility that is difficult to be measured. Through the quota, it can be seen how the 
government leans heavily on the foreign goods after the ACFTA was concluded. 
It then leaves us to the question of whether or not the inflation rate provided 
by Bank Indonesia covers economic situation that truly happens in the country, 
because the disturbance created through non-included measurement variable that 
being left out (like food price) by other government regulation is not reflected in the 
rate (although monetary regulation and other regulation outside the central bank’s 
capacity is not related in term of the monetary policy and the instruments being 
used). 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 The model (both inflation and credibility equations) provided evidences that 
suggested that there is indeed a negative relationship between government 
regulation and the central bank credibility in Indonesia. It indicates that as the 
import agreement (ACFTA) is being held, and the import quota becomes higher, 
the central bank credibility turned out to be lower, through its impact on the inflation 
rate. These results lead to implications such as follow: 
1. Because the import quota to China that being used in the research is limited 
only to food sector, the influence in the inflation rate and the central bank 
credibility is also limited to that sector. The inflation rate is not limited to the 
food price only, because it would not match with the measurement by Bank 
Indonesia, as the non-core inflation is not being put into consideration. 
Nonetheless, it showed that government regulation through this agreement 
had an impact on the inflation rate in a positive relationship. That means, 
the higher the quota, the higher the inflation rate. It would not end up pretty 
when the inflation rate is no longer controllable by Bank Indonesia using 
transmission mechanism instruments, when in reality it still does get 
affected by other factor outside the central bank’s territory.  
In the theory, Inflation Targeting Framework aims for a low and stable 
inflation, and that is also applied in Indonesia’s monetary framework. 
Inflation is already stretching out from the target level through the years, let 
alone having another factor that hinders the transmission mechanism 
process, and on top of that, the factor in question comes from outside the 
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central bank. It can potentially be a disadvantage for the future monetary 
policy application. 
Inflation rate and the central bank credibility based on the estimation result 
showed negative relationship. It also matches the theory, as when the 
inflation becomes higher the central bank credibility would also down to a 
lower level. Further, the negative sign also indicated that the monetary 
policy also linked with fiscal policy in some extent, with some limitations. 
Unfortunately in this case, the relationship is negative. 
2. The findings on the negative relationship between central bank credibility 
and the government regulation indicated the existence of the paradox. Two 
regulations, both came from one extreme point to the other, which are fiscal 
and monetary side, proved that they can disadvantage each other’s 
intentions when conducted at the same time. At least in this case. It then 
leads to another question about the validity of the inflation rate in Indonesia. 
Non-core inflation, weighted inflation, food price and regulation is related 
but not measured on inflation rate, so researches about it, using excluded-
food price inflation rate does not truly represent the real economic events 
happen there. 
  
5.7 Recommendation 
1. From the latest research about the implications of ACFTA to real sector, it 
has been found that it did not really bring much advantages to the small-
scale business in Indonesia. It can be said that from the fiscal side it did not 
result in a good light. The same also happened in the monetary sector, as 
in this research it has been found that it also brings negative result towards 
the goal of central bank, which is creating a monetary stability, or in short, 
a low and stable inflation rate. The policy implication from this discovery is 
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for the government to evaluate its policies, and investigate which one 
cancels out the other, no matter when the polar is not in the same direction 
(monetary vs fiscal). 
2. This research is limited to the food sector of the import quota, but not the 
food price. The result would tell us more about the differences between 
inflation in food price versus general inflation rate that both resulted from 
food import, in a clearer state. And it would show the impact of food import 
regulation to food price inflation more focused and apparent. 
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